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When the flood waters recede, the poor folk along the river 
start from scratch. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is called hurricane roulette.2 And for many, participation in 
the game is a badge of honor signaling a willingness to “ride out 
the storm” in a designated hurricane zone, rather than seek refuge 
by moving to safer ground.3 That is risky, indeed. But even such 
grave risks are minimal compared with the high stakes facing hur-
ricane survivors that are counting on government assistance to 
help them rebuild after the storm. 
Three years after the flood waters of Hurricane Katrina have 
receded, the rebuilding efforts for many of those displaced by the 
storm continue to paralyze the region and prevent meaningful re-
lief. Not only has public housing been “cleaned up” in New Or-
leans, it has been virtually eliminated.4 The rental housing market 
is marked by staggering rent increases,5 rampant discrimination,6
and biased restrictions.7 Even the temporary shelters available for 
displaced people—trailers issued by the Federal Emergency Man-
2.  SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE 
TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SE-
LECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO 
HURRICANE KATRINA 114 (2006) [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/Katrinareport/mainreport.pdf. According to government officials, 
ten to twenty-five percent of people who live in a hurricane evacuation zone will not eva-
cuate; they stay and take the chance that the hurricane will either hit somewhere else or 
that they will be lucky and relatively unaffected by the storm. Id. at 114. This statistic does 
not apply to the poor, sick, or elderly who are unable to evacuate because of immobility or to 
those who are not properly informed as to the risks presented by the storm.  
3.  During Hurricane Katrina, some of the informed, healthy, and capable people who 
made the personal decision that they did not want to leave “were gamblers, long ago court-
ing risk like a lover.” DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE 62 (2006). Brinkley points 
out that Good Samaritans, adrenaline junkies, squatters, and faith-followers convinced by 
parochial pride stay put. Id. As a life-long Floridian, I confess to having elected to “ride out” 
several hurricanes myself. After Katrina, of course, I am more reluctant than ever to adopt 
this approach for serious storms.  
4.  See generally James C. Smith, Disaster Planning and Public Housing: Lessons 
Learned from Katrina (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing 
background information on the condition of public housing in New Orleans). 
5.  Susan Saulny & Gary Rivlin, Renewal Money Bypasses Renters in New Orleans,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at 14; BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, THE ROAD HOME 
RENTAL HOUSING PROGRAM: CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS 2 (2006) [hereinafter THE ROAD 
HOME], available at http://www.bgr.org/pdf/reports/Consequences_for_N.O_._091506_.pdf (“Aver-
age rents have risen by 25% to 30% across the metropolitan area, creating problems for moderate 
as well as low income families.”). 
6.  One study revealed that “[b]lack residents encountered discrimination nearly six 
times out of ten when apartment hunting in the New Orleans area post-Katrina.” Gwen 
Filosa, Bias is Found in Rental Market, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 25, 2007, at 1, available 
at http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-8/1177482229124760.xml& 
coll=1&thispage=1. 
7. See Billy Sothern, A Question of Blood, The Nation, Mar. 27, 2007, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070409/sothern; see generally Olympia Duhart & Eloisa C. 
Rodriguez-Dod, Legislation and Criminalization Impacting Renters Displaced by Katrina, in 
LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 141 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009) 
(discussing consanguinity ordinance in St. Bernard Parish enacted following Katrina).
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agement Agency (FEMA)—have been saddled with their own set of 
dangers.8 The systemic administrative and legislative failures fol-
lowing the storm literally changed the face of New Orleans.9 More 
importantly, the city remains in ruins, standing as proof of the 
government’s breach of America’s social contract.10
This Article uses the difficulties and dangers surrounding the 
FEMA trailers to examine whether disasters such as Katrina 
should compel us to re-imagine the proper role of government in-
tervention in response to harms. The Article examines the respon-
sibilities of the government to the survivors of a hurricane and 
how those responsibilities should be reconfigured in the disaster-
prone.11 Though Hurricane Katrina is a distant memory for some, 
the constant threat of hurricanes in the southeast region (such as 
Hurricane Gustav in August 2008) confirms that these issues re-
8.  See Spencer S. Hsu, FEMA Knew of Toxic Gas in Trailers; Hurricane Victims Re-
ported Illnesses, WASH. POST, July 20, 2007, at A01.  
9.  The city is now whiter and wealthier, quite removed from the community that 
once defined “The Big Easy.” Rick Lyman, Reports Reveal Hurricanes’ Impact on Human 
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A16. The Census Bureau’s first study of Gulf Coast 
areas hit by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, released in June, 2006, showed that New Orleans 
emerged sixty-four percent smaller. Id. The report found that “[t]hose who remained in the 
city were significantly more likely to be white, slightly older, and a bit more well off . . . .” 
Id. The bureau reports were the first to measure the demographic, social, and financial im-
pact of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Id.; see, e.g., WILLIAM H. FREY, AUDREY SINGER & DAVID 
PARK, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, RESETTLING NEW ORLEANS: THE FIRST FULL PICTURE 
FROM THE CENSUS (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/ 
2007/07katrinafreysinger/20070912_katrinafreysinger.pdf.  
10.  See Michael Ignatieff, The Broken Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at 15; see 
also MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER, HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE 
COLOR OF DISASTERS 13 (2006) (discussing Ignatieff’s argument); David Dante Troutt, Re-
marks at the Black History Month Observances at the Community Church of New York 
City (Feb. 10, 2008), available at http://daviddantetroutt.com/speech1d.html (“Political par-
tisanship in the form of a Republican president responsible for the rescue of black residents 
of a Democratic city joined with structural racism and economic marginalization to reveal 
the erosion of the American social contract.”). 
11.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientists, charged by 
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme 
with developing an authoritative statement on climate change, found in its 2007 report that 
several ecological systems were being affected by climate change springing from human 
activities. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12-14 (2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. Further, 
many experts have agreed that climatological changes have made the threat of natural dis-
asters more likely in today’s world. See generally High-Level Conference on Food Security: 
The Challenges of Climate Change & Bioenergy, Rome, Italy, June 3-5, 2008, Climate 
Change Bioengery and Food Security: Civil Society and Private Sector Perspectives, 1-2, Doc. 
HLC/08/INF/6 (addressing concerns that the warming of the climate has increased hydro-
meteorlogical hazards); see also Joel Mintz, Climate Change and Presidential Leadership, 39 
ENVTL. LAW REP. 10045, 10045-47 (2009) (asserting global climate disruption and the objec-
tive case for concern). But see Peter Ferrara, Baby, Baby It’s a Cold World: Explaining Global 
Warming to Congress, National Review Online, June 2, 2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/ 
?q=ZGQ3N2NlNmJjOGFlNDNiNTEzOGY5MjVhY2ZiNGYwNjk=%20%20 (arguing that the 
global warming “hysteria” is a political construct that is more related to class struggle than 
climate or science).  
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main a day-to-day struggle for many.12 In fact, the proliferation of 
natural disasters in the current era makes the safety measures 
and remedies available for government-issued temporary housing 
even more relevant.13 But has the housing assistance available for 
hurricane survivors improved much?14 Presently, it is nearly im-
possible for government inaction in this arena to trigger any pro-
tected recognized rights. The few Katrina survivors who received 
aid are entirely dependent on the government’s conferral of discre-
tionary benefits.15 They are subject to the whims and monumental 
failures of bureaucracy.16 Part II of this Article briefly summarizes 
the housing challenges that persist in New Orleans because of 
Hurricane Katrina and contextualizes the needs for safe shelter. 
Part III traces failures of government accountability through an 
examination of the administrative failures surrounding the so-
called “toxic trailers.” This part details the dangers surrounding 
the toxicity levels in the trailers issued to Katrina survivors by 
FEMA and identifies the problems presented by the distribution of 
the trailers. Part IV reviews the inefficacy of the remedial response 
to the disaster relief and tracks litigation challenges. Part V pro-
12. On September 1, 2008, Hurricane Gustav struck the New Orleans region as a 
Category 2 storm. Editorial, Hurricane Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2008, at A22.  
13.  See Duhart & Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 7; see also NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK 
DOCTRINE 410 (2007) (noting that climate scientists have directly linked increase hurricane 
intensity and frequency to rises in ocean temperature). 
14.  In sharp contrast to evacuation failures with Hurricane Katrina, it was evident 
from the start that the evacuation measures in place for residents in need during Hurricane 
Gustav were a huge improvement from those failures connected to Hurricane Katrina in 
2005. See Jeff Hecht, New Orleans Passes Easy Hurricane Test, NewScientist, Sept. 2, 
2008, http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/hurricane-season/dn14649-why-
gustav-was-no-katrina.html. Before Gustav, contra-flow measures were in place and evacu-
ation plans for almost two million people were being faithfully carried out. Paulo Prada, 
Alex Roth & Jeff D. Opdyke, Weakened Hurricane Hits Louisiana, Grazes Oil Patch, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 2, 2008, at A1. In sharp contrast, both local and federal failures complicated 
and delayed effective evacuations during Hurricane Katrina. See Olympia Duhart, Blowing 
the Lid Off: Expanding the Due Process Clause to Defend the Defenseless Against Hurricane 
Katrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 411, 427-30, 433-37 (2007).  
15.  The September 11th (“9/11”) Victim Compensation Fund has no corollary in the 
Gulf Coast. See DANIEL FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND 
BEYOND 317-19 (2006). Professor Farber argues in support of a fund to support Katrina 
victims in light of the federal government’s role in the flooding and the disadvantaged sta-
tus of most victims. Id.; see also Mitchell F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches 
in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 329 (2006) (advocating the crea-
tion of a Katrina Fund modeled after the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund to 
give financial relief to Katrina-affected residential homeowners to help close the gap be-
tween damages and insurable residential property losses). Professor Crusto asserts that the 
creation of the Katrina Fund would not only provide an opportunity for federal and state 
government to “redeem themselves” but would also stave off “Katrina’s second coming[—a 
flood of] bankruptcies, foreclosures and homelessness.” Id. at 372-73. 
16.  See David Dante Troutt, Many Thousands Gone, Again, in AFTER THE STORM 3, 20 
(David Dante Troutt ed., 2006). (“Without their own city and state to protect them, they 
have become pinballs in a FEMA game of rotating hotel evictions.”). Professor Troutt notes 
that survivors were given multiple conflicting reports about the end of housing vouchers. Id.
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poses a remedy to address the gap in relief offered for trailer resi-
dents; specifically, applying the factors that led to the creation of 
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund.17 This Article proposes the 
establishment of a Toxic Trailer Fund to assist Katrina survivors 
who weathered first a storm, then a slew of government failures. 
Finally, this Article raises and refutes potential counterarguments 
to the establishment of a fund to assist this discrete class of  
storm survivors.  
II. THE STORM AND ITS AFTERMATH—PERSISTENT 
HOUSING CHALLENGES
In the early summer of 2005, before “Katrina” meant anything 
to the National Hurricane Center,18 New Orleans grappled with 
more than its fair share of problems. The city was besieged with 
crime, poverty, and an inadequate public education system.19 De-
spite these shortcomings, New Orleans continued to maintain an 
appeal and culture uniquely its own. One writer observed that, de-
spite its troubles, New Orleans “had a lot more civic life than most 
of the United States.”20 It was a unique American city with a rich 
tradition and a bevy of life-long residents with strong roots in  
the community.21
Then the storm came. By all accounts a seminal event in Amer-
ican history, Hurricane Katrina took more than 1,550 lives22 and 
displaced up to 250,000 people.23 The storm struck areas through-
17.  The full name for the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund is the Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-42, § 1, 115 Stat. 230, 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-
40129 (2006)).  
18.  “Unlike New Orleans’s hurricane evacuation strategy, tracking hurricanes was the re-
sponsibility of the federal government.” BRINKLEY, supra note 3, at 62 (emphasis in original).  
19.  See DYSON, supra note 10, 1-12. Before the storm, New Orleans had a poverty rate 
of twenty-three percent, a figure seventy-six percent higher than the national average. Id. 
at 5-6. New Orleans has a forty percent illiteracy rate. Id. at 8. 
20.  Rebecca Solnit, The Lower Ninth Battles Back, THE NATION, Sept. 10, 2007, at 13. 
Solnit cites the sense of community fostered by social clubs, churches, crawfish boils, and 
extended families. Id. 
21.  Writer Mike Tidwell offers his analysis of the strong appeal of the region: “In my 
estimation, the Cajun Bayou region of Louisiana, at least before Katrina, was the most dis-
tinctive and culturally rich region in America.” Eric Kancler, Bayou Farwell, Mother Jones, 
Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2005/10/bayou-farewell. 
22.  Prada, Roth & Opdyke, supra note 14; see also Editorial, Deaths of Out-of-State 
Evacuees Raise Katrina Toll, WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at A2. The death toll includes 
deaths that are related to the storm or its aftermath. See Editorial, Evacuee Deaths Increase 
Katrina’s Louisiana Toll, ORLANDO SENT., May 20, 2006, at A14.  
23.  ALEX GRAUMANN ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., HURRICANE KA-
TRINA: A CLIMATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2005), available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ 
oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. The storm ultimately impacted 1.5 million people. FE-
MA’s Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 59 (2006) (statement of Richard L. 
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out Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana,24 with Louisiana suffer-
ing the hardest blows.25 Following Katrina, poor people and people 
of color have been priced out of the area’s redevelopment.26 This 
dramatic shift in demographics signals both the demise of a distinct 
black American subculture27 and an absolute crisis in an already 
troubled affordable housing market.28 “The scope of physical de-
struction of homes caused by Katrina has not been experienced in 
the United States since the Civil War. Nearly a million homes were 
damaged; a third of them were destroyed or damaged severely.”29
According to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, the 
residents of more than seventy percent of the most severely dam-
aged homes were low income families.30 Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, and the related levee breaks of 2005, destroyed—or nearly 
destroyed—82,000 rental units in Southeast Louisiana.31 About 
sixty-three percent of these units were located in New Orleans.32
Moreover, the post-Katrina affordable housing crisis is emblematic 
of the urban inequality that pervades America.33 Human rights 
lawyer William Quigley notes that New Orleans is but one sign of 
changes throughout the country: 
What is happening in New Orleans is just a more concen-
trated, more graphic version of what is going on all over our 
country. Every city in our country has some serious similar-
ities to New Orleans. Every city has some abandoned 
neighborhoods. Every city in our country has abandoned 
Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) [hereinafter FEMA’s 
Manufactured Housing Program].  
24.  A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 103. 
25. See FEMA’s Manufactured Housing Program, supra note 23, at 59. More than one 
thousand people perished in Louisiana alone. Id. 
26.  Lyman, supra note 9; see also FREY, SINGER & PARK, supra note 9, at 1. 
27. Editorial, New Orleans Fights for Its Character, Reuters, Jan. 14, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16624152/.  
28. See National Low Income Housing Coalition, Testimony of President of NLIHC to 
Ad Hoc Subcommittee, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=4132 
[hereinafter Crowley testimony]; see also Marcia Johnson, Addressing Housing Needs in the 
Post Katrina Gulf Coast, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 327, 328 (2005-06) (“[T]he regions hardest 
hit by Katrina were already suffering significant housing shortages coupled with limited 
capital to sustain a good quality of life.”).  
29 . Crowley testimony, supra note 28. 
30.  Id.; see also Associated Press, Katrina’s Victims Poorer than U.S. Average, Fox 
News, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168500,00.html. For example, 
prior to Katrina, housing expenditures for almost half of the renters in New Orleans ex-
ceeded thirty percent of the household income—“the federal benchmark for determining if a 
renter’s housing expenditures are burdensome.” THE ROAD HOME, supra note 5, at 2.  
31.  THE ROAD HOME, supra note 5, at 1. 
32.  Id. 
33. See generally David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket 
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 427 (2000). 
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some public education, public housing, public healthcare, 
and criminal justice. Those who do not support public educa-
tion, healthcare, and housing will continue to turn all of our 
country into the Lower Ninth Ward unless we stop them.34
Since Katrina is representative of government failures, its val-
ue as a model should not be overlooked as we seek to set higher 
standards for government response.  
III. GOVERNMENT FAILURES AND TOXIC TRAILERS
The scope of government neglect in post-Katrina New Orleans, 
particularly the abysmal federal response, may be measured by 
the systemic administrative shortcomings of FEMA.35 FEMA was 
established through a 1979 Executive Order, which created what 
was a cabinet-level agency that reported directly to the Presi-
dent.36 Even in its nascent period, FEMA showed signs of fragmen-
tation and limitation. One person involved in the reorganization of 
the agency said it was like making a cake “by mixing the milk still 
in the bottle, with the flour still in the sack, with the eggs still in 
their carton.”37
Administrative fragmentation and a lack of priority for natural 
hazard—including floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes—troubled 
FEMA throughout the 1980s and 1990s.38 Furthermore, the advent 
of terror shifted FEMA priorities away from natural disasters.39
Once President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act in 2002, 
the federal reorganization placed FEMA squarely under the um-
34. KLEIN, supra note 13, at 421; see also William P. Quigley, What Katrina Revealed,
2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2008) (using narratives of Katrina survivors to advance seven 
key lessons for social justice).  
35.  FEMA has since become synonymous for the epic recovery failures of Hurricane 
Katrina. The agency has been subjected to scathing Congressional reports, public censures 
and media lashings. See Editorial, Stonewalling the Katrina Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2005, at A20 (“The recovery effort has been subject to blistering criticism from conservative, 
nonpartisan and liberal groups alike.”).
36.  FEMA History, http://www.fema.gov/about/history) (last visited June 13, 2009).  
37. MITCHELL L. MOSS & CHARLES SHELHAMER, THE CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPA-
REDNESS AND RESPONSE, THE STAFFORD ACT: PRIORITIES FOR REFORM 11 (2007), available 
at http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/pubs/Report_StaffordActReform_MitchellMoss_10.03.07.pdf. 
The cake metaphor refers to the efforts under President Jimmy Carter to streamline the 
federal agencies with whom local and state officials had to work during disaster response 
periods. Id. “President Carter’s authority to create FEMA was limited, forcing him to trans-
fer staff and procedures from existing agencies—and not creating a new, more centralized re-
sponse system.” Id.; see also KLEIN, supra note 13, at 408-09 (referring to FEMA’s contemporary 
efforts as a “laboratory for the Bush administration’s vision of government run by corporations”).  
38.  DYSON, supra note 10, at 44-45. 
39.  See Iris Young, Katrina: Too Much Blame, Not Enough Responsibility, DISSENT,
Winter 2006, at 44. 
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brella of Homeland Security.40 After being “politicized and packed 
with patronage appointments” the agency was entirely unprepared 
to deal with the trouble ahead.41
Perhaps the most tangible and enduring example of FEMA’s 
shortcomings is the distribution of relief homes by FEMA—the 
trailer homes issued to hurricane survivors. Emergency housing 
needs fall to FEMA, which has assisted in rebuilding efforts 
through camp sites filled with mobile homes. Rather than being 
places of refuge, the camps have emerged as sites filled with strain 
and squalor. “[F]or tens of thousands of families, the Katrina crisis 
never ended . . . .”42
As writer Michelle Chen has noted, “[m]any New Orleanians 
see trailers as the fastest means of reestablishing themselves in 
their communities.”43 More than three years after the storm, thou-
sands of survivors are still living in “temporary” trailers. In Feb-
ruary 2007, approximately 275,000 people were living in the travel 
trailers and mobile homes that FEMA purchased after Katrina.44
FEMA reported these shelters cost more than $2.6 billion.45 At the 
peak, almost 119,000 trailers were used to house hurricane survi-
vors.46 At the start of the 2008 hurricane season, Katrina survivors 
still occupied more than 15,000 trailers in the Gulf Coast region.47
40.  DYSON, supra note 10, at 49; see also Chris Strohm, Collins, Lieberman Suggest 
FEMA Remain as Part of DHS, CongressDaily, Mar. 8, 2006 (reviewing calls post-Katrina to 
remove FEMA from the Homeland Security Department and make it an independent agency). 
41. DYSON, supra note 10, at 51. At one point, FEMA had ten times the number of ap-
pointees as other agencies. MOSS & SHELLHAMER, supra note 37, at 11; see also John K. 
Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA’s Failure to Provide 
Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 443 (2008) (criticizing FEMA’s ina-
bility to respond to its charge to meet emergency housing needs).  
42.  Chris Kromm, Coordinator, Gulf Coast Reconstruction Watch, Remarks at the 
Congressional Briefing “Addressing Remaining Low Income Housing Needs for Hurricane 
Evacuees and for the Gulf Coast,” available at http://www.southernstudies.org/2007/ 
09/institutes-capitol-hill-testimony-on-27.html. 
43.  Michelle Chen, New Orleans’ Displaced Struggle for Housing, Jobs, Neighbor-
hoods, NowPublic, Oct. 23, 2005, http://www.nowpublic.com/new_orleans_displaced_ 
struggle_for_housing_jobs_neighborhoods. 
44. Amanda Spake, Dying for a Home: Toxic Trailers Are Making Katrina Refugees Ill,
THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.alternet.org/story/48004/.  
45.  Id. FEMA awarded Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. contracts worth more than $500 mil-
lion for the production of 50,000 trailers within weeks of Hurricane Katrina. The CDC found 
that Gulf Stream, Forest River, Keystone and Pilgrim (all manufacturers of travel trailers) 
had manufactured significant percentages of trailers with formaldehyde levels above one-
hundred parts per billion, “the level at which . . . acute adverse health effects can be expe-
rienced.” COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT 
ON TRAILER MANUFACTURERS AND ELEVATED FORMALDEHYDE LEVELS 1-2 (2008), available 
at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080709103125.pdf.  
46.  Leslie Eaton, Agency Is Under Pressure to Develop Disaster Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2008, at 18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/us/13trailers.html?_ 
r=1&oref=. 
47.  Rhoda Amon, A Look Inside FEMA Housing, NEWSDAY, July 10, 2008, at A28 
(“Estimates range[d] from 15,000 to 37,000.”); see also Maria Recio, House Blasts FEMA, 
HUD, Lawmakers Furious About Storm Victims’ Housing, SUN HERALD, June 5, 2008, at 
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These camper-like units, which cost about $15,000 each, “are 
fabricated from composite wood, particle board and other materials 
that emit formaldehyde.”48 The amounts emitted are dangerous. 
Notably, more than 0.1 parts per million of formaldehyde in air 
can cause eye, lung and nose irritation,49 and the National Toxicol-
ogy Program has determined that formaldehyde may be “reasona-
bly anticipated to be a carcinogen.”50
The Sierra Club conducted air quality tests on forty-four FEMA 
trailers between April and July, 2006 finding “formaldehyde con-
centrations as high as 0.34 parts per million.”51 According to one 
study of the chemical’s workplace effects, that formaldehyde level 
is almost equal to what a professional embalmer would be exposed 
to on the job.52 Among the Katrina evacuees who have called the 
trailers home for the past three years, there are increased reports
A2, (estimating that as many as 22,000 Katrina victims were still living in trailers at  
the time).  
48.  Spake, supra note 44. Emitted from pressed wood and particle board products, 
formaldehyde has a long half life, remaining in indoor air in significant concentrations long 
after a structure is considered “new.” See COMING ALONGSIDE, FEMA TRAILER LIVING AND 
GOOD HEALTH: RECIPES FOR SUCCESS IN THE POST-KATRINA WORLD 2 (2007). “Formaldehyde 
is used in hundreds of products, but particularly in the resins used to bond laminated wood 
products and to bind wood chips in particleboard.” FEMA’s Toxic Trailers: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th Cong. 112-13 (2007) [hereinafter 
FEMA’s Toxic Trailers Hearing] (remarks of Scott Needle, M.D., on behalf of American 
Academy of Pediatrics). The American Academy of Pediatrics, concerned about the special 
vulnerability of children to formaldehyde exposure, urged FEMA to study the children’s 
exposure levels and steps needed to improve the health of exposed children. Id. at 4-5. The
Academy also urged FEMA to set standards for formaldehyde levels in trailers purchased by 
the agency that exceed the current scientific standards to take into account the special ex-
posure of children. Id.
49. See Healthy Child, Healthy World, Chemical Encyclopedia, http://healthychild.org/ 
issues/chemical-pop/formaldehyde (last visited June 13, 2009). (“Formaldehyde is a strong 
smelling, volatile organic compound (VOC) and common indoor air pollutant. . . . [It] is nor-
mally present in air at low levels, usually less than 0.03 parts per million.”). A survey of 
eighty-four funeral directors and apprentices with occupational exposure to formaldehyde 
had the following results: embalmers reported with more frequency than control subjects 
symptoms of irritation of the eyes, upper respiratory tract, and skin. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., AN UPDATE & REVISION OF AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE 
REGISTRY’S FEBRUARY 2007 HEALTH CONSULTATION: FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING OF FEMA
TEMPORARY-HOUSING TRAILERS 12 (2007) [hereinafter FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING], availa-
ble at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/formaldehyde/pdfs/revised_formaldehyde_report 
_1007.pdf. Chronic bronchitis, shortness of breath and nasal irritation were also reported at 
a higher level. Id.
50.  FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING, supra note 49, at 13. “While the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency has ranked formaldehyde a ‘probable’ human carcinogen, the World 
Health Organization recently upgraded its classification to ‘known’ concluding that formal-
dehyde is ‘carcinogenic to humans.’ ” Healthy Child, Healthy World, supra note 49.  
51.  Mike Brunker, Are FEMA Trailers ‘Toxic Tin Cans’? Private Testing Finds High 
Levels of Formaldehyde; Residents Report Illnesses, MSNBC, July 25, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.com/id/14011193; see also SIERRA CLUB, TOXIC TRAILERS: TESTS REVEAL
HIGH FORMALDEHYDE LEVELS IN FEMA TRAILERS (2008), http://www.sierraclub.org/gulfcoast/ 
downloads/formaldehyde_test.pdf.  
52.  Brunker, supra note 51. OSHA limits the formaldehyde to which workers can be 
exposed over an eight hour day to 0.75 parts per million. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (c)(1) (2005).  
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of wheezing, coughing, headaches, lethargy, sinus infections, and 
asthma attacks.53
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, an air 
quality analysis of ninety-six unoccupied trailers, similar to those 
distributed by FEMA to house people displaced by Hurricane Ka-
trina, revealed that formaldehyde levels in those trailers averaged 
1.04 parts per million.54 Those levels ranged between 0.01 parts 
per million and 3.66 parts per million.55 The report also indicated a 
positive correlation between room temperature and formaldehyde 
levels.56 This is especially problematic for the warm, humid  
Gulf Coast.57
Currently, no federal standards are in place to limit formalde-
hyde in building materials used in travel trailers and recreational 
vehicles.58 However, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) has set standards to limit the formaldehyde in 
manufactured housing and mobile homes.59 The limit for plywood 
formaldehyde emission is 0.2 parts per million.60 The HUD limit 
for particleboard materials is 0.3 parts per million.61 Surprisingly, 
these standards still do not apply to travel trailers used as so-
called “temporary” homes for emergency relief.62 FEMA has since 
set its own standard limiting formaldehyde emission to sixteen 
parts per billion, but Congress has not yet taken a stance on what 
the appropriate standards for materials in travel trailers should 
be.63 Rather than imposing minimum production standards on tra-
53.  See Spake, supra note 44. 
54.  FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING, supra note 49, at 13-15. A health consultation 
represents a response to a “specific request for information about health risks related to a 
specific site, a chemical release, or the presence of hazardous materials.” Id. at 2. In July 
2006, FEMA asked the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) to eva-
luate air sampling data collected in the trailers by the EPA. Id. at 4. Though the findings 
are damning, the ATSDR relayed from the onset that the results should not be “generalized 
to all FEMA trailers” or “used to predict the health consequences of living in those trailers.” 
Id. at 5.  
55.  Id. at 15. The second part of the report examined whether ventilation in the trai-
lers—either with open windows or air conditioning—was effective in lowering the levels of 
formaldehyde; the Agency found that both interventions lowered formaldehyde levels. Id. at
15-16.  
56.  Id. at 16. 
57. City Rating.com, Average Temperature, http://www.cityrating.com/cityweather.asp? 
city=New+Orleans (last visited June 13, 2009) (reporting the average temperature for New 
Orleans as 61.8 degrees Fahrenheit and noting humidity reaches over ninety percent in the 
summer months). 
58.  Spake, supra note 44. 
59.  24 C.F.R. § 3280. 
60.  24 C.F.R. § 3280.308(a)(1) (2005).  
61.  Id. § 3280.308(a)(2).
62.  Spake, supra note 44. 
63.  Mike Brunker, Congress Names Names in FEMA Trailer Probe: House Democrats 
Say Manufacturers Knew of High Formaldehyde Levels, MSNBC, July 9, 2008,
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vel trailer manufacturers who stood to make billions of dollars on 
the sale of these homes, FEMA provided virtually no oversight to 
the process.64 The agency relied upon the goodwill and fortune of 
the trailer home manufacturers, who were expected to self-
regulate or respond to safety mandates that no one in the federal 
government had bothered to mention.65 Worse, FEMA continued to 
defend its use of the trailers despite findings by the Sierra Club 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in  
November 2005.66
In July 2007, the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform for the U.S. House of Representatives held an oversight 
hearing on FEMA’s failure to respond adequately to reports of 
dangerous formaldehyde in the trailers.67  Paul Stewart, a Hurri-
cane Katrina survivor, gave the following testimony as part of his 
prepared statement at the hearings: 
The first night we stayed in the camper my wife woke sev-
eral times with difficulty breathing and a runny nose. She 
got up once and turned on the lights to discover that her 
runny nose was in fact, a bloody nose. This scared the hell 
out of us; we didn’t know what was causing her bloody nose, 
or breathing issues and I was beginning to show symptoms 
of my own, which included, burring[sic] eyes, scratchy 
throat, coughing, and runny nose.  
The symptoms continued for weeks and then months and fi-
nally we thought about just leaving, but at that point we 
were stuck because we were still wrestling with insurance 
issues, the Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, our lot was still 
strewn with debris, money was in short supply, and I was 
trying to hold on to my job. We just couldn’t afford to move.68
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25607578/from/ET. 
64. FEMA’s Toxic Trailers Hearing, supra note 48, at 206 (remarks of R. David Pauli-
son, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (“Given decades of successful 
history of using mobile homes and smaller travel trailers to provide temporary housing, we 
had no reason to anticipate problems with the habitability of travel trailer units.”). 
65.  Gulf Stream Coach, which collected more than $500 million and received the bulk 
of FEMA trailer contracts after Katrina, maintains it should not be responsible for formal-
dehyde levels in the trailers because no standards existed when the trailers were made and 
distributed. Brunker, supra note 63. 
 66.  Paul Stewart, Remarks Before the Government Reform and Oversight Commit-
tee, U.S. House of Representatives (July 19, 2007), available at http://www.toxic-trailer.com/ 
govinvdocs/20070719_6.pdf. 
67.  FEMA’s Toxic Trailers Hearing, supra note 48, at 123-29 (including testimony 
from, among others, three displaced Gulf Coast hurricane victims and an industrial hygien-
ist who testified that the limited testing performed by the Sierra Club revealed unaccepta-
bly high levels of formaldehyde). 
68.  Id. at 134-35 (prepared remarks of Paul Stewart). 
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The testimony offered at the hearing was shocking, but consis-
tent with the theme of governmental neglect pervasive in the Ka-
trina narrative. The testimony revealed that monitored levels of 
formaldehyde were seventy-five times higher than the recom-
mended limit set by the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health.69 In the face of this information, FEMA released a 
public statement discounting any risk associated with formalde-
hyde exposure.70 In its early stages, the agency tested only one oc-
cupied trailer to determine its formaldehyde levels.71 Furthermore, 
FEMA’s Office of General Counsel denied repeated requests made 
by some FEMA staff members to conduct testing.72 A House 
Science subcommittee accused FEMA in January 2008 of manipu-
lating scientific research on the formaldehyde issue to minimize 
the potential danger faced by the tens of thousands of survivors.73
Rather than respond quickly to a probable cancer risk, however, 
FEMA officials planned to conceal information with hopes of avoid-
ing any possible liability. 
If the toxins in the FEMA-issued trailers create profound phy-
siological risks for hurricane survivors, the social and psychologi-
cal ills that plague those same people are even more pronounced. 
The FEMA-ville communities—the enclaves of trailers set apart to 
provide housing to Katrina survivors—fuel the alienation that 
serves as the bedrock for a host of other problems. 
“[H]omelessness has doubled in New Orleans, and . . . suicide 
attempts among residents of Mississippi FEMA camps have [in-
creased] seventy-nine times over pre-disaster levels.”74 Women are 
especially vulnerable to sexual assault and domestic violence at 
FEMA camp sites.75 Additionally, children face special social and 
psychological hurdles and are more vulnerable to physical health 
risks presented by chronic exposure to formaldehyde.76 Marked 
69.  Id. at 155 (statement by Chairman and Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
70. Id. 
71.  Id. at 2.  
72.  Id. at 108, 239 (revealing FEMA’s Office of General Counsel shunned testing be-
cause it would compel FEMA to take curative measures, noting that testing should be 
avoided because “should [the results] indicate some problem, the clock is running on our 
duty to respond to them”); see also Elizabeth Schulte, Still Left Behind: Katrina’s Forgotten 
Refugees, Counterpunch, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/schulte09052007.html. 
(describing the conduct of FEMA officials who “did their best to sweep their complaints un-
der the rug”).  
73.  Lawmakers Fault FEMA on Trailers, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at A3. 
74.  Kromm, supra note 42.
75. Peggy Simpson, Women’s Media Center Katrina Campaign: New Study Explores the 
Aftermath for Women, July 10, 2007, http://www.ms.foundation.org/wmspage.cfm?parm1=475 
(mentioning a report by the Institute for Women’s Policy Research indicating that women 
were more “vulnerable to sexual assault and domestic violence” following the storm). 
76.  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Medical Management Guidelines for Formaldehyde, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/ 
mmg111.html#bookmark02 (last visited June 13, 2009) (noting one of the reasons for child-
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increases in psychological displacement and serious mental health 
issues are also prevalent among FEMA trailer residents.77 Fur-
thermore, the physical displacement of Hurricane Katrina survi-
vors no doubt fuels their sense of psychological displacement. Al-
ready set apart by race and poverty, many survivors have their 
“otherness” confirmed through government-sponsored exile.78 The 
pervasive lack of open space and green space—for residents to talk 
and play—has contributed to the psycho-social ills that besiege  
Katrina survivors.79
As bad as life in the FEMA trailers has been, things may get 
worse as FEMA implements plans to force thousands of families in 
New Orleans, and across Louisiana, to leave their trailers.80 Since 
November 2007, FEMA has been working toward closing all of the 
trailer camps it runs for Hurricane Katrina survivors. 81 However, 
the push for relocation did not affect people living in FEMA-issued 
trailers in private trailers parks and those living in trailers in 
front of their hurricane-damaged homes.82 Although FEMA failed 
to meet the original May 2008 deadline for trailer closure, the fed-
eral government recently confirmed that many of the FEMA trai-
lers were contaminated by formaldehyde and renewed its efforts to 
ren’s heightened risk of repeated formaldehyde exposure is the longer latency period of the 
chemical in children). 
77.  Interview by Dr. Lynn Lawry with Madeline Brand, National Public Radio (NPR), 
on NPR (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/ 
Archives?p_action=doc&p_doc. The broadcast notes a study that found people living in  
FEMA trailers had depression rates of seven times the national average and suicide rates of 
fifteen times the state’s norms. Id.
 78.  See Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Domestic Right of Return?: Race, Rights, and Resi-
dency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
325, 351 (2007) (discussing exile and assimilation as the primary means of addressing 
“otherness” in the context of Katrina survivors). 
79.  There is also something to be said for the series of events that led to the reliance 
on the FEMA trailers in the first place. The quagmire that envelops the Katrina survivors 
who live in FEMA trailers demonstrates too well the domino effect of compounded harms. 
Displacement can be traced to a host of social ills including public housing policies, envi-
ronmental threats, and poverty. 
80.  Leslie Eaton, FEMA Sets Date for Closing Katrina Trailer Camps, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/us/29trailer.htm.  
81.  Id. Most of the people living in FEMA trailers at that time—many of which were el-
derly, disable, or living alone—were jammed on playgrounds, church property, and parking 
lots around Louisiana. Id. Notably, a large of these people were renters before the storm. Id. In 
May 2009, FEMA renewed its call to take away trailers from residents in need of temporary 
housing.  See Shaila Dewan, Ready or Not, Katrina Victims Are Losing Temporary Housing.
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A1.   
82.  Id. Housing advocates for Katrina survivors say that the FEMA solution to the 
trailer eviction—providing listings of available rentals and rental assistance—is unable to 
meet the housing needs in the market crisis. Associated Press, FEMA to Close 13 Post-
Katrina Trailer Parks, USA Today, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation 
/2007-11-29-fema-trailers_N.htm [hereinafter FEMA to Close]. In response, FEMA officials 
defended the move as a step in obtaining a permanent housing shortage for survivors. Id.
“I’m not sure that anyone really thought of these trailers as being their permanent home; I 
hope not,” said Ronnie Simpson, a FEMA spokesman. Id.
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move Gulf Coast hurricane victims out of the trailers.83 However, 
even as Hurricane Gustav pressed toward New Orleans in August 
2008, survivors in FEMA trailers scrambled to find shelter.84
Moreover, the hurricane survivors who have been plagued with 
physical illness because of the now-documented formaldehyde 
emissions are not entitled to health benefits to cover their medical 
costs. Emergency room treatments, new medical expenses, and 
chronic complications from the exposure are not covered by the 
government.85 For already survivors cash-strapped, additional 
medical fees can be catastrophic.86
As one activist noted, “This is not what the citizens of the Gulf 
Coast and our country envisioned when, in September, 2005, Pres-
ident Bush pledged from Jackson Square in New Orleans that our 
country would ‘do what it takes, and stay as long as it takes’ to re-
build the Gulf Coast.”87
The regulatory gaps noted above demonstrate the inability of 
the federal government to respond effectively to emergency hous-
ing needs. Furthermore, efforts by FEMA to block a prompt and 
effective investigation of the reports evince its willful abandon-
ment of responsibilities. Even the “Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention—generally considered a repository of nonpartisan 
scientific expertise—was ‘complicit in giving FEMA precisely what 
they wanted’ to suppress the adverse health effects.”88 What are 
the chances for meaningful relief for disaster victims when the 
83.  Leslie Eaton, FEMA Vows New Effort on Trailers Posing Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2008, at A12. 
84.  As Hurricane Gustav approached, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin expressed con-
cern that the FEMA trailers would be swept up and tossed around in the storm. Mike Car-
ney, Nagin Concerned FEMA Trailers ‘Will Become Projectiles,’ USA Today, Aug. 31, 2008, 
http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2008/08/nagin-concerned.html. The push to relocate 
people from toxic trailers is, unfortunately, at odds with the harsh reality that affordable, 
alternative housing is not being offered to displaced people. See Eaton, supra note 83 (citing 
advocates for families who were worried that the sufficient appropriate housing was not 
established for displaced trailer residents).  
85. Even after finally confirming in February 2008 that many trailers were contami-
nated with high levels of formaldehyde, FEMA did not offer any financial assistance to trai-
ler residents to cover related medical expenses. Eaton, supra note 82.
86. See William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina: Human and Civil 
Rights Left Behind Again, 81 TUL. L. REV. 955, 960 (2007) (noting that a survey of Katrina 
survivors in a Houston shelter determined that seventy-two percent of them were not insured).  
 87.  Kromm, supra note 42; see also George W. Bush, President of the United States, 
Address to the Nation at Jackson Square in New Orleans, Louisiana (Sept. 15, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.usa-patriotism.com/speeches/gwb_katrina915.htm). In his speech to the 
nation, the President also invoked the images of Jamestown winters, Chicago after the great 
fire, and the San Francisco earthquake to demonstrate the will of the people to bounce back 
from nature’s wrath. Id. (“Americans have never left our destiny to the whims of nature—
and we will not start now.”). Ironically, the unnatural disasters associated with the storm 
have proven more difficult to overcome.
88.  Lawmakers Fault FEMA on Trailers, supra note 73.  
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agencies are politicized?89 Clearly, a more predictable, objective 
solution is needed to address some of the difficulties that continue 
to haunt Katrina survivors. 
IV. LITIGATION FAILURES: THE INEFFICACIES 
OF THE REMEDIAL RESPONSE
Since Hurricane Katrina, one constant that has emerged is the 
inability of remedial efforts to respond effectively to the challenges 
presented. As more recent litigation efforts make clear, the judi-
ciary is not equipped to remedy the problem of response. To date, 
attempts to address the disaster relief problem through the courts 
have proven time consuming, exhausting, and ultimately unsuc-
cessful. Litigation regarding public housing in New Orleans de-
monstrates the inability of the courts to respond to the government 
harms.90 Finally, the recent failure of litigation connected to the 
levees failures proves how intractable government immunity can 
be.91 The litigation problems connected to the toxicity levels in trai-
lers seems to be just as riddled with difficulties in obtaining  
meaningful results.  
Plaintiffs affected by formaldehyde levels in FEMA trailers 
filed a class-action lawsuit in Louisiana naming the federal gov-
ernment and trailer manufacturers as defendants.92 The suit also 
89.  The other obvious issue—but beyond the scope of this article—is how the recovery 
efforts went so wrong in the first place. Some commentators place the blame on the failure 
of the government to anticipate and meet the needs for adequate emergency housing. See
Eaton, supra note 46 (noting that almost three years after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA still 
had not responded to Congress’s call to develop shelter for victims of natural disasters). 
Many, however, point to plain old capitalism as the driving force behind the move. “In New 
Orleans . . . no opportunity for profit was left untapped.” KLEIN, supra note 13, at 411. 
Another theory asserts that the biopolitics of disposability may play a role in the govern-
ment’s neglect that borders on abuse. See Henry Giroux, Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, 
Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability, C. LITERATURE, Summer 2006, at 171, 172-196 
(arguing that because Hurricane Katrina disproportionately impacted the poor and people 
of color, the systemic hostilities to such groups played themselves out in the willful neglect 
and mistreatment of the survivors); see also David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism  
Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1159-66 (2008) (identifying local-
ism as the source of the persistent racial and economic fragmentation that cripples New Orleans). 
90.  The issue of public housing in New Orleans has been particularly volatile, trigger-
ing lawsuits, intense charges, and disappointment. Adam Nossiter, In New Orleans, Some 
Hope of Taking Back the Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2006, at A22. The fight over the fu-
ture of public housing has drawn some heavy-hitters into the ring as shelter for twenty 
thousand people was at stake, luring bureaucrats, politicians, developers, lawyers, and acci-
dental activists eager to return home. Id.; see also William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity: 
Housing that Working and Poor People Can Afford in New Orleans Since Katrina, 42 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 393, 399-408 (2007) (addressing the issue of affordable housing post-Katrina). 
91. Cain Burdeau & Michael Kunzelman, Louisiana: Katrina Flooding Lawsuit Dis-
missed, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 31, 2008, at A6 (discussing a recently dismissed lawsuit over the 
levee breaches following Katrina in which a federal court cited the Flood Control Act of 1928, 
which shields the government from lawsuits when flood control projects such as levees break). 
92.  Complaint, Hillard v. United States, 2007 WL 647292 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2007) 
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names several travel trailer vendors93 and alleges violation of the 
Stafford Act,94 negligence, strict liability in tort, and breaches of 
implied and express warranties.95 The plaintiffs are seeking to en-
join the defendants from providing FEMA housing, which purpor-
tedly violates federal regulations.96 They also seek payments for 
alternative housing pending completion of mandatory testing for 
suitability; remediation of any defects in housing to bring the for-
maldehyde emissions to acceptable levels; actual, consequential, 
and punitive damages; medical testing and monitoring; and attor-
ney’s fees.97 Based on the barriers confronting plaintiffs in past 
storm-related litigation, the plaintiffs’ chances for success in this 
case appear remote. FEMA has already requested immunity from 
the lawsuits, moving to be dismissed from the cases.98 Moreover, 
even if the court ultimately awards damages, litigation will take 
years to wind its way through the system. An immediate, depend-
able alternative is needed now.  
V. IMPROVING THE ODDS: ESTABLISHING A TOXIC TRAILER FUND
To date, courts have not been able to meet the needs of Katrina 
survivors. Furthermore, legislation has also been entirely unable 
to meet the challenges presented by Katrina.99 However, the criti-
cal review of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
(“9/11 Fund”) serves as a compelling guide for crafting a solution 
for the trailer survivors. Specifically, the factors that led to the 
creation of a 9/11 Fund militate in favor of a compensation fund to 
(No. 06-2576), 2006 WL 1746461.
93.  Id. ¶ 5 (stating that the federal government was “flummoxed” when hundreds of 
thousands of its taxpayers were left with uninhabitable homes following Hurricanes Katri-
na and Rita).  
94.  The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, also known 
as the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, provides federal assistance to victims of disasters. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2006). The Act makes FEMA the agency responsible for directing the 
coordination of disaster relief assistance. See 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 173 (2006).  
95.  Complaint, supra note 92.  
96.  Id. ¶ 64. 
97. Id.
98.  Associated Press, FEMA Seeks Immunity from Suits over Trailer Fumes, USA Today, 
July 22, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-07-22-fema-immunity_n.htm? 
loc=interstitialskip (describing FEMA’s arguments that the government should only be liable 
if it supervised day-to-day activities of its contractors and that a review of legislative history 
demonstrated that Congress intended to bar claims arising from disaster relief).  
99.  See, e.g., Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, Reconstruction 
and Reunion Act of 2005, H.R. 41977, 109th Congress (2005). In fact, some legislation has 
erected roadblocks, rather than reparative measures to address housing needs following 
Katrina. See Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod & Olympia Duhart, Evaluating Katrina: A Snapshot 
of Renters’ Rights Following Disasters, 31 NOVA L. REV. 467, 469-74 (discussing the consan-
guinity statute passed by St. Bernard Parish following the storm and limiting those eligible 
to move into rental housing in the community).  
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assist a special class of Katrina survivors—those facing long-term 
medical complications caused by government-issued toxic trailers. 
The lessons learned from the horrific terror attacks of Septem-
ber 11th100 should not only inform our response to terrorism but 
should also inform our view of government’s role in intervention. 
Just eleven days after the terrorists’ attacks on commercial air-
lines that led to deaths at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, 
and a crash at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, President Bush signed 
legislation aimed at preserving the viability of the air transporta-
tion industry.101 Since the creation of the 9/11 Fund, scholars and 
politicians have questioned whether the legislation signaled a rev-
olution in tort-type compensation schemes or the advent of wel-
fare-relief measures.102 On all accounts, the relief provided by the 
fund was both compassionate and compelling. The fund provided 
money on a no-fault basis to people who would forego tort remedies 
against airlines and other would-be defendants—all payable from 
the U.S. Treasury.103 Though there are obvious differences be-
tween the circumstances that led to the tragedies of 9/11 and those 
that led to Hurricane Katrina, the relief offered by the 9/11 Fund 
provides a workable framework for rethinking and reconfiguring 
the proper role of government intervention following catastrophes.  
According to the Final Report of The Special Master for the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, ninety-seven 
percent of the deceased victims’ families, who might otherwise 
have pursued lawsuits, received compensation through the fund.104
More than $7.049 billion was distributed to survivors of the Sep-
tember 11th attacks.105 The average award for families of victims 
exceeded $2 million, and the average award for injured victims 
was nearly $400,000.106
In defense of the creation of the fund, the Special Master over-
seeing the fund distribution advanced the countervailing public 
policies served by the fund. The following factors were implicitly 
considered in the distribution of the 9/11 Fund: (1) the national 
perspective to a unique tragedy; (2) the uniqueness of the circums-
tances; (3) the need to meet the physical and psychological need for 
100. On September 11, 2001, the United States was victim to terrorist attacks that 
killed almost three thousand people. Joseph P. Fried, The Grim Accounting of Sept. 11 Con-
tinues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 29.  
101. KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 3 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj/gov/final_report.pdf.  
102. Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effec-
tive Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 148 (2005).  
103. Id. at 137. 
104.  FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 80.  
105.  Id.
106.  Id. at 1.  
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closure; and (4) the benefit of a prompt and predictable alternative 
to litigation.107 These same factors should control as we determine 
that a FEMA fund is needed to help storm survivors sickened by 
government-issued toxic trailers.  
A. National Perspective to a Historic Tragedy 
Framing the entire policy argument is the perspective of the 
nation to a historic tragedy. Citing the profound and universal re-
sponse to the day’s events, the Special Master’s report depicted the 
September 11 tragedy as a “unique historical event, similar in kind 
to the American Civil war, Pearl Harbor and the assassination of 
President Kennedy.”108
Hurricane Katrina, the levee breach, and the ensuing flood in 
New Orleans and surrounding regions also constitutes a grave and 
historic national tragedy. Media coverage of Katrina demonstrates 
the extent to which the storm and its aftermath dominated the na-
tional spotlight. Indeed, a Pew Research Center’s News Interest 
Index rated Katrina as one of the most watched news events of the 
past quarter century.109 The high media exposure most likely ex-
plains the recalibration of public opinions regarding federal disas-
ter relief.110 Not surprisingly, Americans surveyed following the 
storm reported “low confidence in government responsiveness.”111
Almost seven in ten of those surveyed said that the federal gov-
ernment did not consider preparedness a top priority.112 Approx-
imately eight in ten of those surveyed blamed federal government 
107.  See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101. In his report, Special Master Kenneth R. 
Feinberg expressly rejected the establishment of a similar act modeled after the Sept. 11 
Fund. Id. at 83 (arguing that absent an attack like September 11th, no program should be 
established to deal with another terrorist attack). 
108.  Id. at 80. 
109.  PAUL C. LIGHT, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, THE KA-
TRINA EFFECT ON AMERICAN PREPAREDNESS 1 (2008), available at 
https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/postkatrina_preparedness.pdf. According to 
the Center, seventy percent of Americans were closely following Katrina, placing it closely 
behind the Challenger accident and the September 11th attacks. Id. Notwithstanding the 
significant media coverage dedicated to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, some commu-
nity activists are working to counter the relatively low media attention given to the toxic 
trailers. Derrick Evans, a school teacher and Mississippi native who heads the Gulf Coast 
Peoples’ Movement for Full and Fair Recovery, has been driving his thirty-two foot FEMA 
trailer—dubbed the KatrinaRitaVille Express—around the country to raise awareness 
about the toxic trailers and failed recovery efforts in the Gulf. Amon, supra note 47.
110.  A survey of Americans pre- and post-Katrina makes the point. The Robert F. 
Wagner School of Public Service and the University’s Center for Catastrophe Preparedness 
and Response (CCPR) surveyed 1,506 Americans four weeks before Katrina hit and 1,004 
Americans five weeks after the storm. LIGHT, supra note 109, at 2. 
111.  Id. at 4. (“The federal government was rated as largely unprepared for three spe-
cific scenarios: terrorist bombings, hurricanes and floods, and a flu epidemic.”)
112.  Id. at 5. 
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failures on disorganization and mismanagement.113 The national 
perception of government failures is not only warranted but  
cemented by the federal government’s refusal to implement cura-
tive measures to protect the people it put in harm’s way. 
B. Uniqueness of the Circumstances 
A major terrorist attack on American soil stunned people 
around the globe.114 One autumn morning, more than 3,000 people 
died as terrorists left an indelible mark on Americans every-
where.115 The events of 9/11 were tragic, but not unprecedented. 
Terrorist attacks also occurred on American soil in the twentieth 
century.116 However, the enormity of the loss of life suffered in a 
single incident and the unimaginable circumstances surrounding 
the attack convinced the 9/11 fund representatives that the cir-
cumstances of September 11, 2001 were different.117
Similarly, the uniqueness of the Hurricane Katrina storm and 
its aftermath created special circumstances for toxic trailer resi-
dents. While hurricanes are commonplace in New Orleans,118 the 
gravity of the storm, combined with the ensuing flooding caused by 
the levee breach, was most unusual.119 The key element in the 
drowning of New Orleans was not a natural disaster; rather it was 
the levee failures bred from bad engineering and misplaced priori-
ties that sank the city.120
Moreover, as was true of the 9/11 Fund, a relatively small class 
of people would benefit from the proposed Toxic Trailer fund, as 
long as that beneficiary group is narrowly defined to include those 
individuals who were (1) affected by Hurricane Katrina,121 (2) 
113.  Id. 
114.  See DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR 246-47 (2008).  
115. Fried, supra note 100. 
116.  The Oklahoma City Bombing took place in 1995. GARDNER, supra note 114, at 260.  
117.  “What happened in September 11, 2001 was—for most of us—as startling and in-
comprehensible as the appearance of a second moon in the sky.” GARDNER, supra note 114, 
at 246. 
118.  Several storms routinely move through the Southeast region of the United States 
during the Atlantic “hurricane season,” which is June 1 through November 30. Tropical 
Cyclone Climatology, National Weather Service, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastprofile.shtml 
(last visited June 13, 2009). 
119.  In addition to the loss of human life, the level of physical destruction in Hurricane 
Katrina was unprecedented. It was easily the most costly natural disaster in U.S. history as 
direct damage is estimated to be around $80 billion. GARDNER, supra note 114, at 260. In-
sured losses are cited at $41.1 billion. Prada, supra note 14. 
120.  Michael Grunwald, The Threatening Storm, TIME, Aug. 13, 2007, at 28. 
121.  Survivors of Hurricane Rita, who also received FEMA trailers after surviving a 
hurricane, would be similarly situated and subject to the same relief. See FEMA Accused of 
Twisting Science in Report on Trailer Danger, CNN, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2008/POLITICS/01/29/fema.trailers/index.html (noting the 150,000 households who have 
lived in FEMA trailers at some point since Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita). While 
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moved into temporary housing by FEMA, (3) exposed to formalde-
hyde in their trailers, and (4) suffered injury or death.122 Since one 
of the 9/11 factors is limiting relief to a discrete class of people who 
are uniquely situated,123 the Toxic Trailer Fund would satisfy that 
criterion. Fairness demands that innocent victims of natural disaster 
compounded by government mistreatment be offered financial sup-
port to help pay for the inevitable medical complications ahead.124
C. The Physical and Psychological Needs for Closure 
The need for closure and a chance to move toward renewal play 
a central role in the consideration of relief.125 The physical and 
psychological wounds of both 9/11 and Katrina will be extremely 
difficult to mend. First, the scope of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
made the horror almost insurmountable.126 Additionally, the tele-
vised attacks were so horrific “it was as if we had watched every-
thing through the living-room window.”127 In addition to the physi-
cal and psychological tests facing people near the explosions, the 
vivid (and sometimes live) images of the disaster on television had 
the ability to psychologically affect people far removed from  
the scene.128
The same traits apply to the Katrina victims. As observed by 
pundits, politicians, and public intellectuals, Katrina and its af-
termath created a nearly endless source of tension and abandon-
ment in the public eye.129 For those personally impacted by Katri-
Katrina survivors are the topic of this paper, the proposed Toxic Trailer Fund would be 
available to anyone who qualifies under the enumerated factors and has suffered medical 
complications due to tainted trailers distributed by the government. This would obviously 
apply to Hurricane Rita survivors struggling with the same toxic trailer troubles. See Edi-
torial, Our view on Disaster Relief: Toxic Trailers for Hurricane Victims? Heckuva job, FE-
MA, USA Today, Aug. 2, 2007, http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/08/post-2.html. 
122.  As an analogue, the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund is limited to individuals who 
were present at the crash site and suffered physical injury or death. Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 402(5), 402(7), 115 Stat. 230, 
237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40129 (2006)).  
123.  FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 79 (defending the Fund’s exclusion of victims 
of other terrorist attacks in Oklahoma City and Kenya). 
124.  In his defense of the establishment of a Katrina Fund, Professor Mitch Crusto 
points out that “[i]t would be unconscionable and plainly inequitable to treat Katrina vic-
tims with less sympathy and financial support than the September 11 victims.” Crusto, 
supra note 15, at 362.  
125.  FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.  
126.  The attacks of September 11, which saw terrorist takeovers of American commercial 
airplanes almost simultaneously in three locations, were the country’s worst terrorist event.  
127.  GARDNER, supra note 114, at 247.  
128.  Id.
129. See generally, Troutt, supra note 16 (a provocative collection of essays about Hur-
ricane Katrina written by black intellectuals); WHEN THE LEVEES BROKE (HBO Films 2006) 
(a documentary detailing the travails of Katrina survivors by preeminent black movie direc-
tor Spike Lee).  
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na, the displacement was profound.130 The storm physically dis-
placed and dispersed survivors throughout the nation.131 More 
than three years after the storm, Katrina survivors still suffer dai-
ly from its effects. With the long-term health side-effects caused by 
toxicity levels in their trailers, survivors will no doubt continue to 
deal with the physical difficulties left behind in the storm’s wake.  
For other people who were safe from the storm’s physical reach, 
ubiquitous media coverage had another effect. Compelling televi-
sion images of an American city under siege made the tragedy very 
real for people far removed geographically from the storm. The 
Congressional hearings held over the toxic trailers shocked even 
the most practiced cynics. Representative Henry Waxman, a Cali-
fornia Democratic and Chairman of the House Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform Committee, said the nearly five thousand pages of 
documents reviewed in connection with the toxic FEMA trailers 
exposed “an official policy of premeditated ignorance.”132
It is no surprise, then, that the abandonment felt by many 
storm survivors following the hurricane is pervasive.133 Even FE-
MA’s efforts to accelerate trailers relocations have left survivors 
stranded and confused. Faced with a choice between a poisonous 
trailer and homelessness, many survivors do not know what to 
do.134 Congress has exposed the distribution of the toxic trailers135
and must now fashion an appropriate remedy to address the prob-
lem.136 FEMA’s delay in addressing the toxic trailers “spawned 
130. See Troutt, supra note 16, at 3-27.  
131. See FREY, SINGER & PARK, supra note 9, at 22. 
132. Gilbert Cruz, Grilling FEMA Over Its Toxic Trailers, TIME, July 19, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1645312,00.html. Representative Waxman 
said FEMA’s attitude was “sickening.” Id. FEMA waited almost a year and a half after the 
first complaint and on the eve of a congressional hearing to act. Id. A federal toxicologist 
also testified at a House Science and Technology subcommittee hearing in April that the 
CDC, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and FEMA manipulated scien-
tific research to minimize the health risks facing residents of the trailers. Associated Press, 
Did CDC Stifle Toxic FEMA Trailer Alerts?, CBS News, Apr. 1, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2008/04/01/health/main3987944.shtml. 
133.  Before the last relocation push over the toxic trailers, FEMA’s earlier mishandling 
of the relocation of Katrina survivors was likened to something out of a Kafka novel. Edi-
torial, Kafka and Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A14 (citing a federal judge’s assess-
ment of FEMA’s aid application process as being so convoluted and confusing that it  
was unconstitutional).  
134.  Shaila Dewan, Holdouts Test Aid’s Limitations as FEMA Shuts a Trailer Park,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A1 (detailing the official closing day of the Renaissance Village 
trailer park, which once housed about six hundred families displaced by Katrina). The tran-
sitional housing—rent vouchers—is sometimes out of reach for survivors because of technic-
al ineligibilities. Id.
135.  The revelation came after congressional hearings and reports by whistle-blowers 
that FEMA had suppressed evidence of the toxic trailers. Rick Jervis & Andrea Stone, 
FEMA to Step up Trailer Relocations, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 2008, at 3A, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-14-toxic-trailers_N.htm. 
136. Like the paradigm adopted for the 9/11 Victim Fund, a special master should be 
appointed to craft appropriate distribution amounts for eligible recipients. See FARBER &
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fresh outrage” over the government’s completely failed response to 
Katrina.137 After so many years, the survivors—as well as the pub-
lic—deserve closure.  
D. Prompt and Predictable Alternative to Litigation 
The last feature of the 9/11 Fund that supports the creation of 
an analogous Toxic Trailer Fund is the absolute necessity of creat-
ing a prompt and predictable alternative to litigation. Although 
9/11 victims had the option of pursuing tort damages against the 
airline industry, more than ninety-seven percent of the families 
voluntarily sought relief through the 9/11 Fund.138 Special Master 
Kenneth Feinberg cites the extraordinary, proactive steps taken by 
the fund to keep claimants informed regarding their options.139 For 
many victims, the transparency and predictability of the 9/11 Fund 
outweighed the risks, uncertainty, and delays connected to litigation. 
The same calculus is likely to appeal to Katrina survivors mov-
ing out of toxic trailers but still facing long-term medical fees. To 
date, efforts to achieve justice for Katrina survivors in the courts 
have not been successful. Court challenges have presented sub-
stantial hurdles for litigants. First, sovereign immunity generally 
protects government agencies from liability.140 Second, a stalled 
and fragmented court system has made it practically impossible 
for litigants to succeed in the courts.141 And finally, litigants are 
likely to face serious difficulty in showing the nexus between for-
maldehyde-laced trailers and subsequent medical problems. For 
many of the Katrina survivors, the expense and expertise required 
to pursue such a claim in court is simply beyond reach.142 Fur-
CHEN, supra note 15, at 317-19. The U.S. Attorney General appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg 
as the Special Master for the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund on Nov. 26, 2001. FEINBERG 
ET AL., supra note 101, at 4. The Special Master promulgated any necessary procedural and 
substantive rules and determined eligibility from the fund. Id. at 3.  
137. Catharine Skipp, Toxic Trailers: Hurricane Katrina’s Victims Cope with Yet 
Another Ordeal—Unhealthy Residences Provided by Uncle Sam, Newsweek, Feb. 16, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/112828/output/print.  
138. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.  
139. Id. For example, walk-in offices were opened in New York and Washington, D.C. 
just fourteen weeks after the tragedy, a toll-free information telephone line was established 
to answer questions, thirty-three separate mass mailings were made to potential claimants, 
a website was updated more than 830 times, and a non-adversarial hearing process was 
established. Id. at 5-15.
140. See Tarak Anada, The Perfect Storm, an Imperfect Response, and a Sovereign 
Shield: Can Hurricane Katrina Victims Bring Negligence Claims Against the Government?
35 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 305-10 (2008) (analyzing the difficulties Katrina claimants face in 
bringing negligence claims against the government).  
141. See Douglas L. Colbert, Professional Responsibility in Crisis, 51 HOW. L.J. 677, 
681 (2008). 
142. Professor Crusto notes that “Katrina [survivors] . . . are not in a financial position 
to wait for possible assistance following protracted litigation.” Crusto, supra note 15, at 362. 
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thermore, meeting the immediate physical needs of the recipients 
would likely mitigate the health risks that the formaldehyde  
exposure creates.  
  Like the 9/11 Fund recipients who were compensated for both 
economic and noneconomic harms,143 the trailer fund recipients 
should be offered compensation for both economic and non-
economic losses. The 9/11 Fund statutory definition of noneconom-
ic losses included, but was not limited to, losses for physical and 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of 
life.144 Such an expansive definition of non-pecuniary losses will 
allow potential claimants under the Toxic Trailer Fund to receive 
full compensation for the massive scope of their losses.  
The creation of a Toxic Trailer Fund is the best alternative to 
help compensate survivors for the losses caused by their exposure 
to toxic trailers.145 It would also serve communitarian needs by of-
fering relief for noneconomic harms that impact recipients of  
toxic trailers.146
VI. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES
The opponents of a Toxic Trailer Fund are likely to raise sever-
al potential arguments. However, each of these concerns  
can be adequately addressed through a commitment to  
government accountability.147
The first counter-argument will most likely be premised on the 
notion that the government has no affirmative duty to provide for 
its citizens. Challengers will likely assert that since the federal 
Constitution creates no positive rights, there is no mandate for a 
government-sponsored recovery fund. Nevertheless, scholars and 
advocates have long challenged the presumption that American 
143. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 4. 
144. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 
402(5), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40129 (2006)). 
The statute prohibited the award of punitive damages. Id. § 405(b)(5). 
145. One of the most common side effects of exposure to formaldehyde is worsened res-
piratory health. See Spake, supra note 44. The majority of 9/11 survivors who received 
payouts from the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund were for asthma and other respiratory 
problems. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 56. Almost fifty-two percent of the claims 
were these illnesses. Id. at 56.
146. Ackerman, supra note 102, at 142 (arguing that the September 11th Fund 
represents one way “the legal response to tragedy can reflect our compassion” by developing 
“a sense of shared history and construct community”).  
147. The existence of criticisms, even legitimate challenges to a trailer fund, should not 
foreclose the possibility of all government relief. Even the September 11th Victim Compen-
sation Fund was not above criticism. See, e.g., Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of 
the Special Master: Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006) (criticizing the September 11th victim Com-
pensation Fund of 2001).  
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citizens are not entitled to positive protection by its government.148
Furthermore, an argument against affirmative duties also fails to 
recognize the special needs created by compounded harms.  
One way to reconsider government responsibility in disaster relief 
is to strengthen legislation that imposes clear, affirmative duties on 
the federal government to respond. Absent a disturbance in the swell 
of constitutional jurisprudence that refuses to acknowledge any posi-
tive rights in the Fourteenth Amendment,149 there must be a reconfi-
guration through legislative channels to honor the social contract.150
Toxic Trailer Fund opponents may also contend that the finan-
cial burden is too high on an already-strained government and 
that the floodgates will be open for a list of assistance funds to cov-
er long-term medical fees associated with natural disasters. How-
ever, adherence to the 9/11 Fund factors in the analysis described 
above will restrict, rather than expand, the class of people to whom 
a relief fund would be available. A commitment to the factors that 
guided the 9/11 Fund will meet the needs of those uniquely si-
tuated while guarding against an open door for people with less 
egregious injuries.  
Critics of the establishment of a Toxic Trailer Fund may also 
argue that people should be responsible for their own well-being. A 
quick survey following initial reports of the toxic trailers suggests 
that at least some people are tired of what they perceive as an end-
less litany of “government handouts.” Yet good government con-
templates a responsibility for others, especially those who are un-
able to protect themselves.151 This value is a sentiment gaining 
momentum among both politicians152 and the public,153 especially 
148. See, e.g., Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 224 (2006) 
(challenging the Rehnquist’s Court’s limiting view of the 14th Amendment as ahistorical).  
149. In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
creates no positive rights in the constitution. Deshaney v. Winnebago Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Such a limitation relieves the government of any affirmative du-
ties to prevent due process violations and concomitantly limits the relief available to citizens 
harmed by government inaction. See Duhart, supra note 14, at 422. Ideally, in a post-
Katrina, post-Deshaney world, the Supreme Court would reconfigure the limit on affirma-
tive duties and act accordingly.  
150. See Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 
CHI. KENT L. REV. 1127, 1170 (2006). 
151. “We are more compassionate than a government that . . . sits on its hands while a 
major American city drowns before our eyes.” President Barack Obama, Acceptance Speech at 
the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/08/28/us/politics/28text-obama.html?.  
152. See generally Representative Keith Ellison, Address at the Midwestern People of Color 
Legal Scholarship Conference (May 30, 2008) (calling for a turn to the politics of generosity).  
153. “Not only did our government fail to answer the call of its most vulnerable citizens 
during that fateful period; it still fails each and every day to rebuild, redeem and rescue 
those who are ignored because of their poverty, their race, their passage into old age.” Wal-
ter Mosley, Shouting Under Water, THE NATION, Aug. 23, 2007, at 18; see also Editorial, 
Tough Choices Ahead: Paying for Katrina Relief, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2005, at L4 (not-
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in the wake of various government bailout programs during the 
current economic hardships.154 Unlike other bailout programs 
sponsored by the government to rescue corporate collapse, the Tox-
ic Trailer Fund recipients can show a direct correlation to govern-
ment activity: the distribution of formaldehyde-laced trailers.  
Finally, the most effective response to opponents of a special 
fund is rooted in the principles of American government. The crea-
tion of a medical fund to assist hurricane survivors who lived in 
toxic trailers will bolster the central democratic value of govern-
ment accountability in two important ways. First, establishing 
such a fund incentivizes the implementation of more stringent 
safety regulations. Second, it demonstrates a commitment to re-
dress for government harms. The contract of citizenship is consti-
tutionally and statutorily defined, but “much of it is a tacit under-
standing that citizens have about what to expect from  
their government.”155
VII. CONCLUSION
The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina require govern-
mental response. The challenge is to reach consensus on framing 
the relief. This relief requires the creation of a Toxic Trailer Fund 
under the paradigm adopted to formulate a proper remedy for the 
victims of 9/11. 
Toxic trailers create immediate physical and psychological 
risks. They also create long-term medical problems that are not 
now covered by the government. As Hurricane Katrina survivors 
from New Orleans and elsewhere struggle to make their return 
home after years of neglect and mistreatment, the government 
must strive to meet basic accountability standards.156 It is particu-
ing that a poll following the storm showed that recovery on the Gulf Coast was a top priority 
for the country).  
154. Nelson D. Schwartz, A History of Public Aid During Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 
2008, at A27. The recent efforts to provide financial assistance to big business are not new. 
Id. For several decades, Washington has bailed out several corporations, including military 
contractor Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the Penn Central Railroad, Chrysler, and Bear 
Stearns. Id.
 155. Ignatieff, supra note 10, at 15. James Perry, Executive Director of the Greater 
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, renewed the call for government aid at the Dem-
ocratic National Convention in Denver, Colorado in August 2008. Press Release, Greater 
New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., Fair Housing Director to Address Democratic Conven-
tion at Denver Roundtable (Aug. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (“We’ve made great progress 
but are far from recovery. As Gulf Coast advocates and citizens we call on America to honor 
President Bush’s commitment to rebuild New Orleans and the American Gulf Coast in a 
manner that is ‘even better and stronger than before the storms.’ ”).
156. Editorial, Katrina One Year After, THE NATION, Sept. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060918/editorshttp://www.thenation.com/doc/2006918/editors/
print?rel=nofollow (“This is the United States, a country that has . . . abandoned the Gulf 
Coast to the social Darwinism of the corporate banditi. It isn’t because we’ve lost the ability 
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larly important to meet these needs in this disaster-prone era.157
Considering the same factors that emerged from the 9/11 Fund—
the national perspective, the uniqueness of the circumstances, the 
need for physical and psychological closure, and the prompt and 
predictable alternative to litigation—the federal government 
should establish a relief fund for toxic trailer residents. 
 The people who survived Katrina have already tested their 
luck against hurricane winds, torrential rains, and flood waters. 
Rather than assist them in their time of need, the government has 
complicated and exacerbated their harms.158 People who have lost 
nearly everything—homes, personal belongings, and those invalu-
able intangibles such as community and familiarity—should not be 
denied government assistance. Unless the law imposes a duty to 
recalibrate its recognition of harm, survivors who have weathered 
a storm and toxic trailers will continue to face a high-stakes gam-
ble in their search for relief. We must improve their odds. 
to care. It’s because we’ve left behind something larger than New Orleans: our notion of 
collective social responsibility.”).
157. The rise in natural disasters also raises the bar for the law to meet new challenges 
in crafting effective responses. See generally FARBER & CHEN, supra note 15, at 317-19. In 
addition, the recent increase in infrastructure failures also challenge the government to 
develop better safety standards to prevent such harms and to develop creative response to 
remedy victims harmed by such tragedies.  Kevin Diaz, I-35W Bridge Tragedy May Yield 
New Rules, StarTribune.com, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/ 
34454549.html?elr=KArksi8D3PE7_8yc+D#aiU (discussing the oversight and design failures 
of the I-35W bridge collapse in Minnesota in August 2007 that killed thirteen people and in-
jured another 145).
158. See NOAM CHOMSKY, The Bush Administration During Hurricane Season, in IN-
TERVENTIONS 147, 149 (2007) (“Lost in the flood is a concern for the needs of cities and for 
human services.”). 
